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Abstract
Stereotypical reasoning assumes that the situation at hand is one of a
kind and that it enjoys the properties generally associated with that kind
of situation. It is one of the most basic forms of nonmonotonic reasoning.
A formal model for stereotypical reasoning is proposed and the logical
properties of this form of reasoning are studied. Stereotypical reasoning
is shown to be cumulative under weak assumptions. Keywords: Proto-
typical Reasoning, Stereotypical Reasoning, Nonmonotonic Consequence
Relations.
1 Introduction
Common sense reasoning in AI requires drawing inferences in a bolder, more
adventurous way, than mathematical reasoning. Many different formalisms that
implement some form of bold reasoning have been proposed, implemented, used
to build artificial systems. Almost no work has been done comparing those
formalisms with the way natural intelligence deals with those tasks. Minsky [5,
6] represents probably one of the only efforts to model reasoning performed by
natural intelligence.
During the last decades, philosophers, linguists, sociologists have revolu-
tionized the way we understand the human mind. Putnam [7] has criticized the
classical philosophical assumptions about meaning, and claimed that stereo-
types are a necessary component of the meaning of terms. Rosch [8, 9, 10] has
put in evidence the essential function of categorization in achieving intelligence
and the intricate ways in which we use it. Categorization is the process in which
we relate a specific object or situation to the kind we shall think it a member
of. She showed that many of our categories have prototypes, i.e., best examples.
Lakoff [3] resumes and expands much of this line of research.
The purpose of this work is to begin the study of inferencing in a mind that
uses categories as described above. A model of the simplest kind of inferencing
using stereotypes will be given and the formal properties of the inferencing
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process will be studied. The formal properties of inferencing that are of interest
have been singled out by [1, 2, 4].
2 Stereotypical Reasoning
In this work, stereotypical reasoning is used to denote what is probably the
simplest form of natural nonmonotonic reasoning. The present use of the word
stereotype is very closely related to Putnam’s stereotypes. He claimed that
stereotypes are a necessary part of the meaning of words denoting a natural
kind. Here, stereotypes are assumed not only for natural kinds but for any state
of information. This could be understood as the assumption that stereotypes
are part of the meaning of any sentence, but the philosophical aspects of this
assumption are not discussed in this paper. The point of this paper is the study
of how stereotypes are used in the inferencing process, and the formal properties
of the inferencing resulting from the use of stereotypes. The use of stereotypes
has not been discussed by Putnam.
What is called here stereotypical reasoning is very closely related to the use
of what Rosch calls prototypical categories. Prototypical alludes, though, to a
richer structure than stereotypical and this is the reason the latter term has been
preferred. In ordinary parlance stereotypes are considered to be typically wildly
inaccurate and an impediment to intelligent thinking. This reputation should
not hide the fact that the use of stereotypes is a fundamental tool, probably
the central tool, in achieving intelligence. Hence, the importance of its study.
Nevertheless, the negative connotation attached to the word stereotype should
remind us we are studying a limited form of reasoning, certainly not capable of
exhibiting all forms of intelligence.
Here is an example of what I will call stereotypical reasoning. The choice of
the tiger stereotype follows Putnam. If Benjamin tells you that during his trip
in India, hiking in the jungle, he saw a tiger, you will assume he saw a large,
frightening animal, yellow with black stripes. Note that not all tigers are such.
Some tigers are small, dead, or albino. You have been using the stereotype that
says that tigers are big, dangerous and yellow with black stripes. The use of
this stereotype may be a mistake: the end of the story may reveal this was an
albino tiger, but, typically, the use of the stereotype is precisely what enables
efficient communication, since Benjamin knows you have this stereotype (as he
has) he assumes you will draw the corresponding conclusions and he intends
you to draw those conclusions.
This simple example already suggests a number of questions, most of them
will not be touched upon in this paper. What is the nature, or the structure
of the stereotype tiger? Is it just a conjunction (or some other composition)
of properties? In this work, we shall assume that yes, a stereotype is a set of
possible states of affairs, but the proper treatment of prototypical categories in
general may need a more sophisticated structure. Note, though, that we are
not assuming (the classical view, attacked by Lakoff and others) that categories
are sets (of models), far from that. We are only assuming that stereotypes are
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sets of models. In fact, the way stereotypes are used makes them function very
much like the graded or radial categories of Lakoff.
How are such stereotypes acquired? This is certainly both deeply rooted in
our physiology and a social process.
Why is this the right stereotype for tiger? Why is it any better than some
other? Here, an analysis of rationality and utility is certainly needed.
What made you apply the tiger stereotype to the little story above and not,
for example, the jungle stereotype that says that, in the jungle, everything is
dark green, or the India stereotype, whatever this is for you? In this paper this
choice will be modeled by some distance between the information at hand and
the stereotype. We shall not be able to explain why a specific distance is used.
Such an explanation would certainly be based on utility considerations.
3 A formal model of stereotypical reasoning
Informally, starting from information about the situation at hand, one chooses
the best stereotype to fit the information and uses both the original information
and the stereotypical information to draw conclusions.
Formally, we assumeW is the set of all possible states of affairs (i.e., models
or situations). We assume a collection (not necessarily finite, but it may well be
finite) of stereotypes, Si. Notice we use lower indexes to identify the stereotypes.
Each stereotype is a subset of W , the set of situations in which the stereotype
holds. For example the tiger stereotype, Stiger could be the set of all models in
which tigers are frightening live animals, yellow with black stripes.
The user has some information, i.e., facts, about the situation at hand. This
information is modeled by a subset F of W : the set of all situations compatible
with the information at hand. On the basis of F , the reasoner picks up one of
the stereotypes: SF , the stereotype most appropriate to F , in a way that will be
discussed later. Notice we use here an upper index to denote the stereotype that
best fits some information F . The reasoner will then conclude that the actual
state of affairs is one of the members of the intersection F ′
def
= F ∩ SF . The
nonmonotonicity of the reasoning stems from this jump from F to the subset
F ′. Clearly, we do expect the set F ′ to be non-empty, assuming F is non-empty,
since we want to avoid jumping to contradictory conclusions. It will be the task
of the function that defines the best stereotype to pick a stereotype that has a
non-empty intersection with the information F at hand. In many cases the facts
F are given by a formula α that is known to be true. In this case F is the set
of all models that satisfy α. We shall identify the formula α and the set of its
models and write Sα for the stereotype most appropriate for the sets of models
of α. A formula β is then nonmonotonically deduced from α iff it is satisfied by
all elements of F ′, that is iff any model m in the set Sα that satisfies α satisfies
β: α∼β iff ∀m ∈ Sα, m |= α implies m |= β.
Syntactically, this may be described as taking for C(X), the set of nonmono-
tonic consequences of a set X of formulas, the set Cn(X, g(X)), of all formulas
that logically follow from the set X ∪ g(X), where g(X) is the set of formulas
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that hold in all models of the stereotype that best fits X .
Our analysis of stereotypical reasoning will use the simplistic model just
described, since it is good enough for the purpose of this paper. If one thinks
of first-order languages and models, one may want to refine this model and
associate a stereotype with each one of the objects of the structure: e.g., if
our story refers to two tigers about which one has different information, one
will perhaps use different stereotypes for each of the tigers: a mother tiger
stereotype and a pup tiger stereotype for example.
Before we analyze some consequences of this model, let us point out some of
its basic limitations. It is assumed that the conclusions from facts F are drawn
by identifying a unique stereotype most appropriate for F . One may ask whether
this should be the case. Instead of picking up a single stereotype, perhaps one
should consider the set of all most appropriate stereotypes and use them all,
i.e. their intersection. Indeed the results of next section would hold also in
this more general model, but the uniqueness assumption will be needed later.
Intuitively it seems to me that we do pick up a unique stereotype, sometimes
made up of different stereotypes, but that this composition is almost never the
simple juxtaposition, i.e., conjunction of stereotypes. The main reason probably
is that such conjunctions are very often empty and we certainly want to avoid
drawing inconsistent conclusions from consistent facts. Consider, for example,
our tiger above. We did not use both the tiger and the jungle stereotypes
because they clash about the color of the tiger: yellow and black vs. dark
green. It may be the case that a very smart reasoner will use a tiger in the
jungle stereotype, that implies the tiger is barely visible, but this stereotype,
though including, somehow, both the tiger and the jungle stereotypes, cannot
be reduced to their conjunction. To avoid premature commitment to a theory
of the formation of compound stereotypes, this paper will just assume any set
F of facts is associated with a unique stereotype.
4 First consequences of the model
As general as it is, the model presented above has some important consequences
for the formal properties of the process of nonmonotonic deduction it defines,
i.e., of the consequence relation ∼.
First, since what is defined by facts F is a set of models, F ′, the set of non-
monotonic consequences of F , i.e., the set of formulas that hold in all elements
of F ′ is a logical theory, i.e., closed under logical consequence. In other terms,
the relation ∼ satisfies the rules of Right Weakening and And of [2]. Secondly,
since F ′ is a subset of F , any formula that is logically implied by F holds in all
elements of F ′, or, the relation ∼ satisfies the Reflexivity of [2]. Lastly, since
the information at hand is represented, semantically, by a set of models, the
relation ∼ satisfies Left Logical Equivalence.
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5 Further assumptions
The main purpose of this work is to consider whether other, more sophisticated,
logical properties may be expected from stereotypical reasoning. It is clear that,
in the very general model described above, without further assumptions, nothing
more can be expected: given any relation ∼ satisfying Left Logical Equivalence,
Reflexivity, Right Weakening and And, one may define, for any formula α, the
stereotype Sα to be the set of all models that satisfy all the formulas β such
that α ∼β. Since the relation ∼ is reflexive, all models of Sα satisfy α and, for
any α, Sα ⊆ Fα. Therefore Fα ∩ Sα = Sα and the nonmonotonic consequence
relation defined by the model is exactly ∼.
Our goal is to find some additional, reasonable, assumptions about the set
of stereotypes or the way the best stereotype for a set F is chosen that will have
interesting consequences on the nonmonotonic logic defined. In fact, the set of
stereotypes and its structure does not seem to play an important role here and
we shall concentrate on the choice of the best stereotype.
Notice that the mapping from a set F to its best stereotype SF may be very
wild. We do not expect, for example, that F ′ ⊆ F should imply SF
′
⊆ SF . It
may well be the case that robins is the best stereotype for birds, but the best
stereotype for antarctic birds is, for lack perhaps of knowledge of a better one,
vertebrates.
It is extremely helpful to consider the process of associating to the set F the
stereotype SF as based on some notion of distance between information sets
and stereotypes: the best stereotype for F is the stereotype closest to F :
d(F, SF ) ≤ d(F, S), for every stereotype S. (1)
Notice that this notion of distance is a bit unusual, since it is defined only
from information sets to stereotypes. We shall never use the notion of the
distance from a stereotype to an information set. The assumption that our
choice is based on some notion of a distance does not limit the generality of
our model, since one may always find a suitable distance to fit any choice of
best stereotype. The interest of this assumption is that it suggests some natural
additional assumptions on the properties of this distance. Those assumptions
will be related to logical properties of the nonmonotonic deduction.
Let us suppose D is a partially ordered set (of distances) and that there is a
function d that associates an element of D d(F, S) with every set of models F
(in fact every set of models that could appear as an information set would be
enough) and every stereotype S. A first assumption, already described above,
is that this distance always enables us to pick a unique best stereotype.
• Assumption zero: for any given information set F there exists a unique
stereotype SF such that d(F, SF ) ≤ d(F, S) for any stereotype S.
A number of examples of models and choice functions will be described. They
may not be very intuitively appealing, but their purpose is to help the reader
understand our definitions and prove the consistency of the assumptions that
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shall be made below. In all examples the set D of distances is taken to be the
set of integers, eventually with ∞ added.
Example 1 There is one stereotype only: S0 and S0 =W . The exact definition
of the distance is irrelevant. Assumption zero is satisfied trivially and, for any
F , SF = S0 =W . Clearly, for any F , F
′ = F ∩ SF = F , and therefore F ′ is
non-empty if F is. The non-monotonic logic defined happens to be monotonic
and to be the classical one: α ∼β iff α ⊢ β.
Example 2 Assume the set W is finite. Every set S ⊆W is a stereotype and
d(F, S) = | S − F | − | S ∩ F |,
where | A | indicates the cardinality of the set A. Since d(F, F ) = − | F |≤ d(F, S)
for any S, we see that, for any F , SF = F , and therefore assumption zero is
satisfied, F ′ = F and the logic defined is the classical one as in Example 1.
Example 3 Assume the set W is the set of natural numbers. Stereotypes
are singletons of W . Distances are defined in the following way: if n ∈ F ,
d(F, {n}) = n and if n 6∈ F , d(F, {n}) =∞. Clearly SF is the singleton that
contains the minimal element of F , min(F ) and assumption zero is satisfied.
Note also that F ′ = min(F ) is non-empty if F is non-empty. The model boils
down to considering that world m is more probable than world n iff m < n. The
logic defined results in, given a set of possibilities F , jumping to the conclusion
that the most probable one must obtain. This provides a highly nonmonotonic
consequence relation.
The next example presents a simple, but natural, family of models.
Example 4 Assume W is finite and the set of (non-empty) stereotypes Si,
i = 0, . . . , k − 1 provides a partition of W , i.e.,
⋃
i∈k Si =W and Si ∩ Sj = ∅,
for any i 6= j. Given a set F , we associate with it the stereotype Sj which
covers F best, i.e., for which the size of the set S − F is minimal. In case this
criterion does not define a unique stereotype, choose the stereotype with smallest
index. Formally we may define the distance by: d(F, Si) =| Si − F | +
i
k
. The
consequence relation defined is nonmonotonic.
After these examples, let us consider interesting properties of the distance d.
Since F and S are both sets of models (subsets of W ) we may, without loss
of generality, assume that d(F, S) = e(F ∩ S, S − F, F − S). Three additional
assumptions concerning the way the function e depends on each of its three
arguments are now natural.
• Assumption one: the function e is anti-monotone in its first argument.
I mean that if A ⊆ A′, then e(A′, B, C) ≤ e(A,B,C). The relation ⊆ is
the subset relation. This assumption is very natural: d(F, S) measures
the closeness of F and S: the more they have in common, the closer they
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are. In most cases we expect that the best stereotype for F should be
consistent with F , i.e., have an non-empty intersection with F . If this is
the case, our assumption is only slightly stronger: all other things being
equal, the best stereotype for F has the largest intersection with F . The
set F ∩ SF represents the nonmonotonic consequences of F ; we prefer
weaker consequences, therefore we prefer to take the set F ∩ SF as large
as possible.
• Assumption two: the function e depends monotonically on its second ar-
gument. Here I mean that if B ⊆ B′, then e(A,B,C) ≤ e(A,B′, C). The
second argument, B = S − F measures the set of models compatible with
the stereotype but excluded by the information. Notice that the stereo-
type may be vague, i.e., contain a large number of elements: for example
the bird stereotype may include birds of many colors, and the informa-
tion at hand may exclude a lot of those elements: for example we may
know the bird we are discussing is yellow. The more such elements are
excluded by the information at hand, the less suitable is the stereotype:
if too many such elements are excluded a more specific stereotype may be
more suitable. In our example, a yellow bird stereotype, if there is one
such stereotype, should be preferred.
• Assumption three: the function e does not depend on its third argument.
It seems easy to justify that the function e should depend monotonically
on its third argument, by an argument very similar to that used for justi-
fying assumption two. It is perhaps a little less obviously natural that e
should not depend at all on its third argument. But, notice that the set
F − S is a measure of the strength of our nonmonotonic inference: the
larger it is the more nonmonotonic consequences we get in addition to the
monotonic ones. The argument just above is to the effect we should not
get too many such inferences, but we are certainly interested in getting
such nonmonotonic consequences, and should not try to minimize them.
Our assumption is that how much nonmonotonicity we get should not be
a criterion in choosing the best stereotype.
Assumptions one to three may be summarized by the following: for any F ,
F ′ and any stereotypes S, S′, if
F ′ ∩ S′ ⊆ F ∩ S and S − F ⊆ S′ − F ′ then d(F, S) ≤ d(F ′, S′). (2)
Proof:
d(F, S) = e(F ∩ S, S − F, F − S) ≤ e(F ′ ∩ S′, S′ − F ′, F ′ − S′) = d(F ′, S′)
One may notice that Equation 2 implies that d(F, S) = d(F ∩ S, S). Let us
consider the examples above again. In Example 1, we may define the dis-
tance d to be constant, for example d(F, S) = 0. Equation 2 is obviously sat-
isfied. In Example 2 also, Equation 2 is obviously satisfied. In Example 3,
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let us check that Equation 2 is satisfied. Since stereotypes are singletons,
F ′ ∩ S′ ⊆ F ∩ S implies that either F ′ ∩ S′ = ∅, or S′ = S = F ′ ∩ S′ = F ∩ S.
In the first case d(F ′, S′) =∞ and the result holds. In the second case, if
S = {n}, d(F, S) = n = d(F ′, S′). For Example 4, if F ′ ∩ S′ ⊆ F ∩ S then,
either F ′ ∩ S′ = ∅, or S′ = S. If S − F ⊆ S′ − F ′, then either S − F = ∅ or
S′ = S. If S′ = S = Si,
d(F, S) = | S − F | +
i
k
≤ | S′ − F ′ | +
i
k
= d(F ′, S′).
If S′ = Sj 6= S = Si, F ′ ∩ S′ = ∅ and S − F = ∅,
d(F, S) =
i
k
< 1 ≤ | S′ | ≤ | S′ | +
j
k
.
Equation 2 is satisfied.
In the sequel we shall assume, sometimes without recalling this explicitly,
that the distance d satisfies Equation 2.
Our main result is that stereotypical reasoning yielded by a distance that
satisfies the four assumptions above: i.e., uniqueness of the closest stereotype,
antimonotonicity of the distance d(F, S) in F ∩ S, monotonicity in S − F and
independence from F − S, is cumulative [2]. The main result is therefore the
following.
Theorem 1 If F ∩ SF ⊆ F ′ ⊆ F , then SF
′
= SF .
Proof: Assume F ∩ SF ⊆ F ′ ⊆ F . We must show that, for any stereotype S,
we have d(F ′, SF ) ≤ d(F ′, S). First, since F ∩ SF ⊆ F ′, we have both F ∩ SF ⊆ F ′ ∩ SF
and SF − F ′ ⊆ SF − F , therefore, by Equation 2, we have d(F ′, SF ) ≤ d(F, SF ).
By Equation 1, for any stereotype S, d(F, SF ) ≤ d(F, S) and therefore, for any
S, d(F ′, SF ) ≤ d(F, S). Using, now, F ′ ⊆ F , we see that F ′ ∩ S ⊆ F ∩ S and
S − F ⊆ S − F ′. By Equation 2, then, d(F, S) ≤ d(F ′, S), and d(F ′, SF ) ≤ d(F ′, S),
for any stereotype S.
Corollary 1 The nonmonotonic consequence relation ∼ defined by stereotyp-
ical reasoning yielded by a distance that satisfies Equation 2 satisfies Cut and
Cautious Monotonicity and is therefore cumulative.
Proof: Suppose α ∼β. Let F be the set of models of α and F ′ be the set
of models of α ∧ β. The assumption α ∼β means that all elements of F ∩ SF
satisfy β, i.e., F ∩ SF ⊆ F ′. But clearly F ′ ⊆ F . By Theorem 1, SF
′
= SF and
F ∩ SF = F ′ ∩ SF
′
and α ∼γ iff α ∧ β ∼γ.
Karl Schlechta [11] has found a cumulative consequence relation ∼ that cannot
be defined by any stereotypical reasoning system yielded by a distance that
satisfies Equation 2. The exact characterization of those cumulative relations
that can be defined by stereotypical systems that satisfy Equation 2 is open. In
the next section, we shall discuss another basic logical property of nonmonotonic
system described in [2], Or, i.e., preferentiality.
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6 Preferentiality
Suppose each one of two information sets, F and F ′ enable us to conclude that
some formula α holds: all elements of F ∩ SF and all elements of F ′ ∩ SF
′
satisfy α. Does this imply that the union F ∪ F ′ enables us to conclude α, i.e.,
do all elements of (F ∪ F ′) ∩ SF∪F
′
satisfy α? The discussion of [2] explains
why this seems to be a natural property to expect. For example, assuming we
would conclude that a bird that lives in the country flies, and that we would
also conclude that a bird that lives in a city flies. Must we conclude that birds
that live either in the country or in a city fly? Stereotypical reasoning does
not always satisfy this property for the following reason. I guess that natural
common-sense reasoning does not either, for the same reason. Suppose β and γ
describe very different situations, whose best stereotypes are different. It may
happen, nevertheless that the same property α will be shared both by models
of β ∩ Sβ and of γ ∩ Sγ . But the best stereotype for β ∨ γ may be very general
and some models of, say, β ∩ Sβ∨γ may not satisfy α. Intuitively, if the reasons
for concluding α from β are very different from those for concluding α from γ,
there is little hope we shall be able to conclude α from the disjunction β ∨ γ.
There is one interesting case, though, the case SF = SF
′
, in which the desired
conclusion follows if we strengthen one of the assumptions above. Since the
function e does not depend on its third argument, by Assumption three, we
shall write it as a function of two arguments. Let us assume:
• Assumption four: e(A ∪ A′, B) = min{e(A,B), e(A′, B)}.
Clearly, assumption one already implies e(A ∪ A′, B) ≤ min{e(A,B), e(A′, B)}
and assumption four implies assumption one.
Theorem 2 Let assumptions zero–four be satisfied. If SF = SF
′
, then SF∪F
′
= SF .
Proof: Notice that we do not claim that the nonmonotonic consequence re-
lation defined is preferential. Assume SF = SF
′
. We must show that, for any
stereotype S, we have d(F ∪ F ′, SF ) ≤ d(F ∪ F ′, S). Then,
d(F ∪ F ′, SF ) = e((F ∩ SF ) ∪ (F
′ ∩ SF ′), SF − (F ∪ F
′)) ≤
e(F ∩ SF , SF − F ) = d(F, SF ) ≤ d(F, S).
Similarly d(F ∪ F ′, SF ) ≤ d(F ′, S) and
d(F ∪ F ′, SF ) ≤ min{d(F, S), d(F
′, S)} = d(F ∪ F ′, S).
The last equality stems from assumption four.
Consider our examples above. In Example 1, the function d is constant and
therefore satisfies condition four. The consequence relation, being classical, is
in fact preferential. In Example 2, the function d proposed does not satisfy
assumption four, nevertheless the relation defined is preferential. In Example 3,
the function d satisfies assumption four. The consequence relation defined,
being classical, is in fact preferential. In Example 4, assumption four holds, and
therefore the conclusions of Theorem 2, but the consequence relation defined is
not preferential.
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7 Conclusion
A formal description of stereotypical reasoning has been provided. Under rea-
sonable assumptions about the way stereotypes are attached to information sets,
this model yields a cumulative system. The assumptions one–three concerning
the distance between information sets and stereotypes may perhaps be tested
experimentally. Preferentiality has been discussed, and found unplausible in
general, but a more limited natural property has been put in evidence. Again,
preferentiality should be tested experimentally. The conditions proposed above
that imply good logical behavior are sufficient but not necessary. Other con-
ditions may be more natural and also sufficient. The structure of the set S
of stereotypes, in particular, has been left completely arbitrary. A reasonable
assumption may be that this set has a tree structure: i.e., that if S and T are
any two stereotypes such that the intersection S ∩ T is not empty, then S ⊆ T
or T ⊆ S.
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